This paper addresses the issues of disclosure for financial conglomerates principally from the perspective of the Basel committee: that is, disclosure is important for the safety and soundness of banks. However, I reach substantially different conclusions with respect to three important issues: the role of market value accounting, the frequency of disclosures, and the role of subordinated debt.
I start by asking why any special disclosure might be required for financial conglomerates. This question immediately leads to a discussion of what is special about financial conglomerates. I also address the question, Disclosure to whom? There are at least two potential audiences for information disclosure: (a) financial regulators and (b) the public investors, creditors, and customers of a financial conglomerate. Issues related to the appropriate structure for a financial conglomerate and the revelation of information that should accompany that structure also are raised. Finally, I return to the title of this paper: What constitutes appropriate disclosure for a financial conglomerate?
Much of the discussion refers to the financial and regulatory institutions of the United States and their experiences. The insights and lessons to be drawn from the discussion, however, have wider applications.
Why Should There Be Any Special Disclosure for Financial Conglomerates?
I start with fundamentals. Why should there be any special disclosure for financial conglomerates? This, of course, naturally leads to an even more basic question: What is special about financial conglomerates that would warrant special disclosure?
The specialness of a financial conglomerate must rest with the presence of a depository or an insurance company embedded within it.
2 I start with a depository-specifically a bank.
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petitive subsidization of banking across countries. If a country permits its banks to operate at insufficient levels of capital (but everyone knows that transactors with those banks will be bailed out in the event of financial difficulties), this constitutes an implicit subsidy for those banks. See White (1996a) . 2. As is argued below, some of the same issues that arise for depositories and insurance companies also arise for defined-benefit pension plans. But defined-benefit pension plans are almost always embedded in the employer that offers pensions to its employees and solvent and would be considered adequately capitalized by the standards established by the Basel committee in 1988.
5
The bank's capital is simply the arithmetic difference between the bank's assets and its liabilities. The bank's capital has no separate existence or measurement, except as represented by this arithmetic difference.
Let us now examine a second stylized balance sheet in figure 2, where the bank has suffered a substantial reduction in the value of its assets. Instead of the positive capital of $8 in figure 1, the value of the bank's deposit liabilities in figure 2 exceeds the value of its assets by $12; its capital is -$12. It is badly insolvent.
Typically, the depositors do not have recourse against the owners of the bank to cover the shortfall-because of a legal structure of limited liability for the owners of a corporation (the bank), because of a legal structure of personal bankruptcy that accords limited liability for the owners of a bank, or both. Consequently, the depositors have to absorb and distribute the loss among themselves. 5 . This bank has a ratio of assets to capital of 12.5 to 1. This is frequently described as a leverage ratio. The concept of leverage is readily grasped by noting that an increase in the value of the assets by $4 would also increase net worth by $4; but the former percentage increase would be only 4 percent, while the latter percentage increase would be 50 percent-a 12.5-fold multiple in the percentage increase. The same percentage multiplying effect applies to decreases in asset value. Although the absorption of loss by liability holders is a general problem where limited liability is present, 6 it is a special problem with respect to banks, for at least three reasons. First, some bank depositors may be relatively unsophisticated, poorly informed, and in a poor position to protect themselves against the losses from a bank's insolvency; 7 also banks are more opaque (and thus more difficult to be informed about) than are other enterprises. 8 Second, and related to the first, banks are especially vulnerable to runs by imperfectly informed depositors, who may be uncertain about the financial condition of their bank and who fear that they may have to absorb some losses. Because the bank's loan assets are generally less liquid than its deposit liabilities (it typically keeps only a little cash on hand), even a solvent bank cannot immediately satisfy the demands for withdrawals of all of its depositors-or even the demands of more than a small fraction of depositors. If forced to meet the demands of more than that small fraction, the bank must (a) borrow from somewhere, 9 (b) call in its loans or liquidate its illiquid assets at short notice and likely at less value than would occur from a more orderly and leisurely sale, or (c) shut its doors and delay paying its depositors until its loans are repaid or assets can be sold in an orderly way, thereby reneging on its liquidity commitment to its depositors. Accordingly, a "prisoner's dilemma" may well arise. Although a bank may be solvent and informed depositors know that it is solvent, they may fear that other depositors are worried about the condition of the bank and that the latter's withdrawals would strain the bank's resources. In that case, even the knowledgeable depositors would race to the bank to withdraw their funds first. But such a general race to the bank would strain even solvent banks, thus making everyone worse off.
Third, there may be a "contagion" effect, where depositors of one bank, seeing a run on another bank, may fear for the solvency of their 6. And lenders (liability holders) generally try to protect themselves, through covenants and lending restrictions, against the risk-taking and other behavior of corporate owners that could cause losses for the lenders.
7. That is, they are unlikely to develop covenants and lending agreements. 8. See Morgan (2002) . 9. A lender of last resort-the central bank-can provide loans to a bank and thus help it to deal with depositor withdrawals. But then the central bank is effectively a creditor to the bank and must concern itself with the bank's solvency. bank-or may just fear that other depositors of their bank will become worried and begin to withdraw. Alternatively, because banks are at the center of the payments system and are frequently in the position of being a short-term lender or borrower vis-à-vis other banks, the insolvency of one bank may cause a cascade of insolvencies of other creditor banks (or may cause a contagion of runs by banks-as-creditors who have imperfect information and fear insolvency).
Some version of these scenarios (plus the perceived position of banks as special lenders) has caused the American polity, since the early nineteenth century, to consider banks to be special and to develop special regulatory regimes to deal with their specialness. At the center of such regimes have been efforts to maintain their solvency-to keep them "safe and sound." Since 1933 federal deposit insurance has provided an additional layer of assurance (and thus an additional damper on potential runs) by protecting depositors against regulatory failure.
10 In an important sense, with deposit insurance in place, safety-and-soundness regulations become the rules that protect the deposit insurer (as well as uninsured depositors and other creditors).
There are four major components to safety-and-soundness regulation:
11 (a) minimum capital requirements, 12 (b) limitations on activities,
13
(c) management competency requirements, and (d) in-the-field examiners and supervisors to enforce the rules. The minimum capital requirements are the direct efforts to maintain a bank's solvency. This was the primary focus of the 1988 Basel Accord and remains the first of the three pillars of Basel II. The limitations on activities can be seen as efforts to limit risk; 14 some important structural issues are related to these limitations and to the revelation of information, a subject to which I return below. Management competence is related to operational risk, which is a component of the capital requirement that is the first pillar of Basel II. And the enforcement of the rules requires in-the-field examiners and supervisors, with effective supervision serving as the second pillar of Basel II.
Limitations on Activities and the Appropriate Structure for a Bank
Let us proceed on the assumptions of the previous section: banks are special, and safety-and-soundness regulation is an appropriate means of dealing with their specialness. Placing limitations on activities has been a traditional tool of safety-and-soundness regulation. The logic for limitations can be seen from a reexamination of figures 1 and 2. If the bank is to remain solvent (that is, its capital is to remain positive) despite the uncertainties of future outcomes, then minimum capital requirements must be specified for all of the activities that could negatively affect the bank's balance sheet.
There is an immediate implication. 15 The only activities that are appropriate for a bank are those that are "examinable and supervisable" and thus can be regulated in a manner that is consistent with the safe-andsound operation of a bank. In practice, this would mean an activity for which regulators are capable of setting suitable capital requirements and making judgments about the competence of the bank's management of the activity. 16 This examinable-and-supervisable decision ought to be a regulatory judgment, but the political appointees heading the regulatory agency should be held accountable for those judgments.
Any activity that is not appropriate for a bank (because regulators are not able to set capital requirements or to judge managerial competence in the activity) should nevertheless be permitted for the owners of a bank, for a bank holding company, for an affiliate or subsidiary of the holding company, or for a bank subsidiary (so long as the bank cannot count the net worth of the subsidiary as an asset of the bank).
17 Figure 3 provides a highly stylized and condensed picture of the consequent structure of the location of appropriate and inappropriate activities for a bank.
As a practical matter, loans and loan-like products are highly likely to be deemed appropriate for a bank. Regulators are familiar with them and believe that they can set appropriate capital requirements and judge managerial competence. What about the two financial services whose appropriateness for banks was at the center of two decades of contention in the United States-securities activities and insurance activities? The logic of the examinable-and-supervisable approach is that the placement of activities within a bank, or alternatively somewhere in a related entity, ought to be determined by the ability of bank regulators to set capital requirements and judge managerial competency. And what if a bank decides that it wants to operate a delicatessen? Although bank regulators might be able to hire restaurant consultants who could provide advice as to appropriate levels of capital and ways of judging managerial competence, it seems likely that bank regulators would decide that this activity was not an area of their expertise and ought not to be permitted for a bank-but should be permitted for a bank's owners or for a bank's subsidiary.
Finally, even with activities sorted by examinable and supervisable criteria, the transactions (for example, loans or the sale or purchase of assets) between the bank and its owners, affiliates, and subsidiaries must be closely monitored, because they provide a ready means for siphoning resources from the bank. The bank may overpay for some services that it buys or undercharge for some services that it sells and thereby become insolvent.
18 There are also indirect ways that a bank can be weakened to the benefit of its owners. The bank may misprice transactions to friends of the owners, who in turn provide payment or favors to the owners. Or, in the context of a financial conglomerate, a bank may provide loans to a company whose equity shares are being underwritten by the conglomerate's securities affiliate. Although such loans may have a sound basis in the special information that the securities affiliate possesses and forwards to the bank, the loans may instead be a way for the bank to provide risky support for the company so that the securities affiliate reaps benefits from the company through investment banking fees.
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Consequently, such direct and indirect transactions between the bank and its owners and affiliates must be on arm's-length terms and monitored closely, and penalties for violations must be severe.
The Similarities with Insurance Companies and Defined-Benefit Pension Funds
Part of the logic of the case for safety-and-soundness regulation extends to at least two other financial institutions: insurance companies and defined-benefit pension funds. 20 Figures 1 and 2 can be readily adapted to portray stylized versions of each. For either, the assets can be loans or other investments. Instead of deposit liabilities for banks, the insurance company would have the likely claims of its insureds as liabilities, and the pension fund would have the likely claims of its pensioners. An insolvency for either, along the lines of figure 2, would mean that the assets of the institution are inadequate to cover the claims.
Although neither type of institution is subject to the risk of runs that banks face, their claimants are likely to be poorly informed or in a poor position to protect themselves against actions that could put their claims at risk. Accordingly, it is not surprising that every state has a safety-andsoundness regime that applies to insurance companies and that all states have mutual guarantee funds that serve as a financial backup for a claimant whose insurance company has become insolvent. Similarly, since 1974 the claimants of defined-benefit pension funds have had recourse to guaranty coverage provided by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and the PBGC and the Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration have safety-and-soundness regulatory powers vis-à-vis defined-benefit pension plans and their corporate parents.
21
Appropriate Disclosure to Regulators
The safety-and-soundness regulatory regimes that surround banks (and insurance companies and defined-benefit pension plans) need information about their regulated institutions. Since maintaining solvency is the primary goal of the regulation, I first focus on the representation of solvency: the balance sheet of figure 1.
22 I also discuss the riskiness of the balance sheet 23 and the special concern about transactions with affiliated parties.
Financial Statements
As briefly described above, a financial institution's balance sheet portrays the assets and liabilities of the institution at a specific point in time. The system for ascribing values for assets and liabilities and thus their portrayal on the balance sheet are crucial aspects of disclosure, as is the frequency with which the information is updated. I first address the issue of accounting systems and then discuss the frequency with which updated balance sheets should be issued. Finally, I contrast my recommended approaches with those of the Basel committee.
21. Beyond these two categories of institutions, the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) provides insurance for investors who leave their securities with a brokerage firm that becomes bankrupt. This is seen as protection for the poorly informed small investor. And the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes minimum capital requirements on securities broker-dealers, as a system or network protection for brokerdealers that transact with each other. (It is unclear, however, why the knowledgeable securities firms themselves cannot impose capital-solvency discipline by informing themselves as to which of their potential trading partners is skirting insolvency and thus should be shunned in any transaction that requires the extension of credit to that firm.) Finally, the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) are regulated for safety and soundness by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), because of the two companies' federal charters and special privileges and the financial markets' consequent perceptions that the U.S. government would cover their liabilities in the event of their financial difficulties.
22. Although our focus is primarily on the balance sheet, the profit-and-loss statement is inexorably linked to it, so our discussion implicitly covers that as well.
23. And thus limitations on activities are implicitly covered.
a market value accounting approach. Capital serves two important functions. 24 First, it is the direct indicator of solvency-the direct buffer that protects depositors (or the deposit insurer) against a decline in the value of the assets. Second, because capital is essentially the owners' equity in the bank, greater capital is a disincentive to risk-taking, since owners have a larger relative stake in the bank (which would be at risk).
The logic of these functions points strongly toward regulators' receiving balance sheet information that best represents this buffer and incentive-disincentive. This logic points to the use of market value accounting (MVA), where market values are used wherever possible for asset and liability values. 25 Unfortunately, this is not the standard accounting system for financial statements presented either to regulators or to the public. Instead, the standard accounting system-generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)-is a backward-looking, historical cost-based system for assigning values to assets and liabilities. Although GAAP does have some elements that reflect current market values, 26 it is primarily based on historical costs, and this perspective pervades standard accounting.
The drawback to GAAP for the purposes of safety-and-soundness regulation is straightforward. A bank's solvency, by definition, diminishes as the value of its assets declines (or the value of its liabilities increases). And it is just at the time of diminished solvency that the owners' incentives to take greater risks increase (since the owners have less to lose), but the downside of that risk-taking means even greater losses and possible insolvency. Accordingly, bank regulators should want to know about declines in asset values as rapidly as possible, so as to limit the risktaking behavior that might exacerbate those declines.
27 But GAAP, with its historical orientation, is slow to recognize changes in the value of assets, either down or up, and thus does not serve regulators well.
Although this slowness to recognize changes in asset value looks evenhanded, it is not. First, regulators have asymmetric concerns. They care much more about insolvency than about overly high levels of capital. Second, banks have a ready but dangerous strategy for circumventing GAAP's slowness to recognize asset gains: sell the assets that have embedded gains.
28 But banks can continue to hold assets that have declined in value and continue to account for them at the cost of acquisition. In essence, GAAP provides banks with a valuable option.
This strategy of selling "winners" to recognize gains (which can be sent, via dividends, to owners) while holding "losers" at historical cost can logically lead to a balance sheet with only overvalued assets, whose current (market) values are below their nominal values as listed on the balance sheet. This is not a recipe for maintaining the true solvency of a bank.
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It might appear that the numbers on the balance sheet do not matter, so long as regulators know the "true" value (that is, market value) of assets and liabilities. And GAAP (since the mid-1990s) has required a footnote statement of the market value of financial assets. But regulators are driven largely by what is represented on the balance sheet, not what is in the footnotes. The regulatory rules are written largely in terms of capital as reported on the balance sheet. The ability of regulators to restrict a bank's behavior is driven by the balance sheet's report of capital, as is the ability to appoint a receiver and thus wrest control from the owners.
30
There are two main objections to a system of MVA.
31 First, opponents claim that it would introduce more volatility into banks' income statements. Support for this claim is sometimes provided by a "back casting" Lawrence J. White 257 28. Under some circumstances, financial institutions may not even have to sell the assets; they may be able simply to reclassify them within their portfolios from a hold-tomaturity account to a held-for-sale account; see Patrick Barta, "Fannie Mae Critics Pounce on Boost in Holder Equity," Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), October 25, 2002, p. A2.
29. Also GAAP's slowness to recognize gains can lead companies generally to engage in uneconomic behavior, such as a sale and the leaseback of a facility, just so the company can recognize the gain on its balance sheet.
30. During the period of the 1980s and early 1990s, when almost 1,500 commercial banks became insolvent and required regulatory action, bank regulators complained that they knew that some of these banks were in financial difficulties but that their apparently healthy (GAAP) balance sheets forestalled earlier preemptive action. See FDIC (1998).
31. See, for example, Engelke (1990) and Fisher (1992 
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A second objection is that some assets and liabilities may have no ready markets for valuation purposes, and thus estimates would be required-opening the door to potential error and manipulation. This argument has gotten progressively weaker, as larger portions of banks' assets have become securitized or otherwise sellable. Further, significant parts of a bank's balance sheet already require estimates and judgments-for example, the life and depreciation of assets, the timing of when the value of an asset should be considered impaired and written down and the extent of the write-down, and the liability costs of the benefits of future retirees.
Still, even where there are no perfect substitutes that have market valuations, there may be close substitutes that, through modeling, can be related to the balance sheet assets in question. The modeling, of course, must be validated, first by the bank's auditor and ultimately by the regulator. But even imperfect modeling, if done and monitored responsibly, 33 is likely to be an improvement over the backward-looking focus of historical cost accounting. Only where market analogs and reliable modeling are not available ought historical costs to be the standard.
The same general principles should apply to the valuation of liabilities as well.
the frequency of reporting. The current standard for frequency of reporting of financial statements is once a quarter, although regulators can require more frequent reports from banks that are of concern. This is far too infrequent. Banks do not slide into difficulties only at the end of a calendar quarter.
In an age when every bank is or should be wholly electronic in its financial accounts (and thus the marginal costs of frequent reporting ought to be quite small), more frequent reporting is both desirable and feasible. Weekly reporting should be the immediate goal, and daily reporting ought to be a near-term goal. Daily reporting is the standard for securities firms and investment banks. It should also be the standard for commercial banks and other depositories.
the basel committee's approach. Unfortunately, the Basel committee is hostile to MVA, embracing the historical cost orientation of GAAP. Although it acknowledges the problem of selling winners and holding losers, the committee is worried about increased volatility and imperfect estimates. 34 The committee has consequently greatly weakened the effectiveness of its capital standards.
The Basel committee's approach to frequency of reporting is one of silence as to specificity. 35 Again, this weakens the effectiveness of its capital standards.
Riskiness
Information about the riskiness of a financial conglomerate is only partially conveyed by the entries on its balance sheet. More information is needed. I first discuss the additional information that regulators should receive and then describe the Basel committee's approach. the necessary information. The primary regulatory approaches to riskiness are the insistence on adequate capital (for activities that are examinable and supervisable) and the exclusion of activities that are not examinable and supervisable. Essential to the determination of adequate levels of capital is a measure of the risk characteristics of the assets and liabilities, including any covariance effects. And essential to that determination are forward-looking stress tests that indicate how well the institution's capital (that is, the net arithmetic outcome of assets less liabilities) survives a variety of unfavorable macroeconomic scenarios. Further, of course, all such outcomes must be calculated in MVA terms.
Consequently, regulators need detailed information about the types, amounts, characteristics, and histories-including covariances-of all assets and liabilities of a bank. And they need a standardized stress test that is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed so as to be able to use all of the information to forecast outcomes.
Further, because transactions with owners and affiliates are potential vehicles for siphoning resources out of the bank, detailed information about such transactions is essential. In addition, information about indirect transactional advantages provided to owners or their affiliates is necessary.
Finally, a requirement that banks issue a tranche of tradable long-term subordinated debt as part of their required capital-say, equal to 2 percent of their assets-would provide regulators with an additional source of information from the capital markets. 36 The presence of subordinated debt would bring to the bank a group of stakeholders whose interests would be similar (though not identical) to those of the regulator, since the holders would not gain from the upside of risk-taking and would be the first parties affected by the downside after the owners' equity was erased. If issued as long-term debt with layered maturities, its holders could not all run on the bank simultaneously. The pricing of the debt would itself be an important source of information. And the layered maturities would mean that the bank would be rolling over and reissuing the debt at frequent intervals, providing an important additional source of information.
the basel committee's approach. The Basel committee has three alternative approaches to risk. First, and simplest, is its "standardized approach" to credit risk. 37 Similar to its 1988 capital standards, the standardized approach has a number of risk categories (buckets), with a capital requirement (risk weight) for each category. The standardized approach expands the number of buckets (as compared to the 1988 stan-dards) and includes information on the bond ratings of any borrower that has rated debt. 38 However, it does not encompass an explicit forwardlooking stress test; 39 it does not acknowledge covariances; 40 and it relies on GAAP rather than MVA for measurements of capital.
Second is the committee's "foundation internal ratings-based approach," whereby a bank can provide its own estimates of default probabilities. 41 The Basel II document provides the other components of risk, including loss in the event of default, exposure at default, and allowances for offsets. Forward-looking stress tests are expected to be part of the bank's estimation procedure. But the stress tests need not be conducted any more frequently than once every six months. Again, covariances are not explicitly acknowledged. And, again, all capital measurements rely on GAAP rather than MVA.
The third method is the committee's "advanced internal ratings-based approach," whereby a sufficiently sophisticated bank can provide its own estimates of the other components of risk. Otherwise it is similar to the second approach.
Further, the committee takes no specific stand on what activities are or are not appropriate for a bank, although it is suspicious of "significant" equity holdings in commercial enterprises, 42 and it recognizes the risks of transactions with affiliates.
The committee's concerns about special disclosure with respect to financial conglomerates appear to be focused largely on the risks of multistage financial leveraging or gearing. 43 This issue is readily demonstrated in a modification of figure 1, as shown in figure 4. Instead of all $100 of the top-tier bank's assets being devoted to loans, $8 is devoted to an equity investment in a subsidiary second-tier bank. With that $8 of equity, the subsidiary bank can attract $92 in deposits and make $100 in loans-or even itself set aside $8 for an equity investment in a third-tier bank. Thus, in principle, multitiering means that the original $8 of equity Lawrence J. White 261 38. For a critique of that inclusion, see White (2002a) . 39. To the extent that companies' bond ratings are part of the process, forward-looking stress tests are present, since that is a component of bond ratings.
40. Except for explicit hedges and other offsets. in the top-tier bank has achieved substantially greater leverage (and reduced protection for deposits) than the 12.5-to-1 capital-to-assets ratio of the simple bank of figure 1. The committee also points out that this multitiering could occur with an insurance company or a securities firm as the parent or the subsidiary. The committee's approach to the multistage leveraging problem is to insist on consolidation at the parent level for the purposes of determining adequate capital-that is, ensuring adequate capital at the level of the parent bank so as to take into account the full leverage of the overall conglomerate. However, the committee fails to acknowledge explicitly that this multistage leveraging is a general problem that applies to any equity position taken by the bank.
Finally, the committee fails to endorse a requirement for the issuance of subordinated debt, a mechanism that (as argued above) would yield additional valuable information for regulators.
In sum, the Basel committee's approach falls substantially short of appropriate disclosure to regulators-in the accounting framework employed, the frequency of reporting, and the specifics of addressing risk.
Appropriate Disclosure to the Public
Appropriate public disclosure by publicly traded companies is a broad topic that extends considerably beyond the issues surrounding financial conglomerates. The Basel committee's interests in disclosure do not extend broadly, however. They are concerned solely with disclosure as the third pillar to support the safe-and-sound operation of banks. Nevertheless, the broader context is worth considering before focusing on the committee's concerns.
The Broad Issues
Generally, the extent to which regulatory involvement in public disclosure is required depends on one's view of investors. I offer two broad views in order to highlight the contrasts. 44 the asymmetric information-awareness model. This approach starts by assuming that potential lenders and investors are aware of the asymmetric information problems that pervade finance. They realize that potential borrowers have more information about themselves and about their prospects for repayment than do the lenders and that actual borrowers may know more about their actions and the effects on repayment than do the lenders. 45 Lenders therefore recognize that they need to acquire information about prospective borrowers so as better to assess the riskiness of prospective borrowers, to decide to whom to make loans (and to whom to say no) and on what terms, and to monitor their actions after advancing a loan, so as to be able to intervene if circumstances warrant.
Here I describe the lenders-investors in this paradigm a bit more. They are aware of their informational limitations. Loosely, they "know that they don't know what they don't know." They may occasionally be fooled by deliberately misleading information, but they learn from this experience and move on. They rarely are fooled by vague or inadequate information. Because they are risk averse as well as aware, the presence of less (or inadequate) information about a prospective borrower causes the lenders to fear the worst about that borrower and to add a large risk premium in their consideration of whether to lend and on what terms.
In this context, financial statements provide an important source of information about enterprises that want to borrow, which helps the aware lenders to pierce the fog of asymmetric information in assessing prospective borrowers beforehand and in subsequently monitoring them. Equivalently, financial statements allow an enterprise to emerge from the fog of asymmetric information and better show its true prospects.
However, financial statements are not free; resources are required to gather, process, certify, and disseminate an enterprise's financial statements. Greater details and specificity of disclosure-although providing greater assurance to lenders-are generally more costly. Also an enterprise will be reluctant to reveal proprietary information that competitors may use to their own advantage and to the enterprise's disadvantage. Further, with respect to an enterprise's managers vis-à-vis its investorsshareholders-owners, the managers generally prefer to reveal less to the shareholders, since revealing less information gives them greater flexibility of actions. But revealing more (useful) information helps to dispel the fog of asymmetric information for the investors and reduces the costs of equity capital to the enterprise.
Consequently, the enterprise tries to find the cost-minimizing point in the trade-off between the higher direct costs of greater information disclosure and the lower costs of capital from greater revelation. This costminimizing point should yield the most efficient financial statement disclosures for that enterprise.
With a multiplicity of enterprises in an economy, this quest for efficient disclosure appears to yield a multiplicity of formats and accounting systems-perhaps one for each enterprise. But the transactions costs for lenders and investors of translating the various firms' financial statements-in essence, the network aspects of financial reporting and the role of accounting-indicate that such a multitude of systems would itself be costly for enterprises and their lenders-investors, because of the incompatibility (comparison) costs. Accordingly, enterprises face a further set of trade-offs in disclosure-between the lower transactions costs of adhering to a more widely used accounting system and the higher costs of adhering to a less widely used system that is better at portraying a specific enterprise's information.
In this context, the role of government regulation with respect to disclosure is relatively modest. It consists primarily of policing fraudulent disclosure and helping firms and their investors-lenders to deal with the network aspects of disclosure. The latter would involve helping the system to decide whether one or a few accounting systems will be the basis for disclosure (as a template) by the enterprises that will be subject to the comparisons of the capital markets of an economy. 46. As the number of accounting systems increases, the number of comparisons between systems increases more rapidly. If there are n systems (and one of them is considered to be the base system for comparisons), then there are (n 2 -n) / 2 potential comparisons; hence, an extra system-that is, (n + 1) systems-yields (n 2 + n) / 2 comparisons. The difference between them is n. Thus each additional system adds ever-more comparisons and greater complexity and costs. For example, if we start with four systems, there are six comparisons; an additional system raises the number of comparisons to ten; an additional system after that (bringing the total to six) raises the number of comparisons to fifteen. White (1996a) points out that if each of the fifty states in the United States had its own GAAP, this would entail a potential for 1,225 comparisons between systems. On templates, see Sunder (2001) ; Dye and Sunder (2001) . the investor protection model. As compared with the awareness paradigm just described, an investor protection model entails more than just protecting investors from deliberately misleading information (that is, fraud) and helping them to navigate the network issues. 47 Instead, the lenders-investors in this model are not fully aware of their informational limitations. They can be fooled by vague or inadequate information; they do not realize that they need to pierce the fog of asymmetric information (or impose a large risk premium for remaining in the fog).
These lenders-investors need not be complete dupes; instead, they just cannot deal appropriately with vagueness. 48 Consequently, opportunistic corporate managers take advantage of this gullibility by remaining vague; some lenders-investors experience losses as a consequence; and rather than learning from their experience and moving on, the lendersinvestors instead stay away from the securities markets (and tell their friends to do likewise), thereby reducing the liquidity and depth of the markets and raising the costs of capital. 49 This paradigm calls for a much more active role for government regulation of disclosure, beyond policing fraud and dealing with network issues. Disclosure must be mandated, with extensive detail required.
Appropriate Disclosure
I now address the question of appropriate disclosure of financial conglomerates to the public. As a first approximation, requiring the same general framework of financial disclosure from financial conglomerates as from other publicly traded companies in the economy seems about right. After all, from the perspective of shareholders or of creditors (other than insured depositors), financial conglomerates are just another set of firms embedded in the fog of asymmetric information with which they must deal.
However, two qualifications to this position should be made. First, as argued above, banks (including, but not limited to, those that are part of a larger conglomerate structure) ought to be required to issue subordinated debt. The holders of this subordinated debt may well demand additional financial disclosure from banks. This is all to the good.
Second, because securities firms are at the center of the operations of the securities markets, their errant actions are more likely to yield negative externalities for the overall markets. Consequently, they should bear a higher responsibility for their disclosure concerning their activities.
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Accordingly, when a securities firm is an affiliate of the bank, the customers of the securities firm should receive information about any connections among the securities affiliate's underwriting activities, its analysts' recommendations, and the bank's lending.
The Basel Committee's Approach
As noted, the Basel committee's approach to public disclosure for financial conglomerates is not rooted in concerns about disclosure in general. Instead, the committee envisions information disclosure as bolstering market discipline, which serves as the third pillar for safety and soundness in banking.
The committee's arguments in support of disclosure are surprisingly brief, consisting of about a page and a half in a supporting document. 51 In essence, the committee argues that the transactors with a bank can be a constraint on risk-taking by the bank if they are aware of the bank's actions and positions. With information revelation, the bank's creditors, counterparties, customers, suppliers, and so forth can find out about risktaking earlier and can protect themselves earlier by ceasing their relationships with the banks or insisting on improved terms for continuing the relationship. These reactions, in turn, deter the bank's management from embarking on the course of risk-taking in the first place.
Consequently, the committee mandates an extensive menu of public disclosure for a bank. Indeed, it is difficult to distinguish between the committee's expectations for disclosure of information to regulators and its expectations for disclosure to the public. The former, of course, can be expected to remain as confidential information; the latter most certainly cannot. In that connection, the committee does not address the trade-offs between the short-and long-run efficiency consequences of the public disclosure of proprietary information and the potential benefits for transactors and ultimately for safety and soundness.
Further, the committee does not address how effective market discipline can be if the transactors with banks believe that governments will intervene and bail out the bank and its transactors (beyond the explicitly insured depositors). If the belief in bailouts is pervasive, then the disclosure is largely irrelevant, and market discipline is largely absent. In addition, the transactors are likely to be sophisticated parties (and would have to be, in order to be able to absorb and use the elaborate menu of information disclosures recommended by the committee). Why would they not be able to protect themselves by making their own demands for information (or declining to transact)?
52 Finally, by not endorsing the mandatory issuance of subordinated debt, the committee has forgone an important potential source of market discipline and of market pressures for information disclosure.
53
In sum, although market discipline has a resounding ring, the committee's arguments for the disclosure of public information generally and for the disclosure of specific information are weak indeed. And the committee undermines its best opportunity for achieving market discipline by failing to endorse mandatory subordinated debt.
Conclusion
The appropriate information disclosure for financial conglomerates has been and will continue to be an important area for policy concern. As this paper has argued, there are at least two audiences for information disclosure: bank regulators and the general public. They should be distinguished.
There is little doubt that the goals of Basel II-to improve the safety and soundness of banks-are worthy. The specific measures chosen, however, are more open to question. By turning its back on the three most important steps that could be taken to improve information disclosure-mandating market value accounting for banks' reports to regulators, aiming toward daily electronic submission of those reports, and requiring the issuance of subordinated debt-the Basel committee fundamentally undermines the achievement of those goals.
